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This paper investigates the impact of new firms’ quality on the 
magnitude of their employment effects. Our results clearly show that the 
quality of start-ups, measured by their affiliation with sectors and 
innovative industries, strongly influences the direct and the overall 
employment contribution of new firms. In particular, start-ups in 
manufacturing industries generate larger direct and overall growth 
effects than those in services. Moreover, new businesses in innovative 
manufacturing and in knowledge-intensive service industries make a 
larger direct contribution to employment than start-ups affiliated with 
other industries. We also find a relatively strong overall effect of new 
business formation in knowledge-intensive service industries. However, 
the impact of start-ups in innovative manufacturing industries on overall 
regional employment growth is not statistically significant, which may be 
mainly due to their rather small share in all start-ups and because they 
impact more on firms and employment in other regions than do start-
ups in non-innovative manufacturing. Finally, we discuss the 
implications for entrepreneurship policy that can be derived from our 
findings. 
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1. Aims and scope
 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that the magnitude of the effect of 
new business formation on employment and economic growth is closely 
related to the quality of new businesses.
1 With regard to the effects on 
economic development, the quality of a start-up can be generally 
understood as the intensity of competitive pressure it brings to bear on 
incumbents. This competitive challenge can be regarded as the main 
driving force behind the effect new businesses have on economic 
development (for an overview, see Fritsch, 2008). The quality of a new 
business may be indicated by factors such as the innovativeness of its 
goods and services, the qualification of the entrepreneur, the marketing 
strategy pursued, and the amount and quality of resources mobilized, 
as well as by its productivity. 
The present paper investigates the link between the quality of new 
businesses and the magnitude of their employment effects for West 
German regions in the 1988–2002 period. The quality of start-ups is 
measured by their affiliation to broad economic sectors (manufacturing 
and services) as well as to innovative industries.
2 We analyze the 
employment contribution of new ventures by distinguishing between the 
employment development in entry cohorts, which represents their direct 
                                            
 We are particularly indebted to Niels Bosma, Florian Noseleit and Viktor Slavtchev 
for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
1 E.g., Baptista and Preto (2011), Falck (2007), Fritsch and Noseleit (2009b), Engel 
and Metzger (2006), and Metzger and Rammer (2009). 
2 Another aspect of the quality of new businesses is their competitiveness in terms of 
survival on the market. At the industry level, Falck (2007) finds that new businesses 
that survived for at least five years (“long-distance runners”) had a significantly 
positive impact on GDP growth, while the effect of entries that stayed in the market for 
only one year (“mayflies”) was statistically insignificant or significantly negative. Fritsch 
and Noseleit (2009b) confirm this result at the regional level. According to their 
analysis, start-ups that survived four years or longer had a significantly positive effect 
on employment growth, while the effect of new businesses that survived less than four 
years was insignificant or even significantly negative. 
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employment effect, and their overall impact on growth, including their 
indirect effect. Our basic hypotheses are that 
(a)  cohorts of high-quality start-ups have a relatively strong direct 
employment effect, i.e., they create comparatively more jobs than 
other new firms, and 
(b)  high-quality start-ups are a stronger challenge to incumbent 
suppliers and, therefore, generate stronger overall effects on 
regional development than their lower-quality counterparts. 
Section 2 explains in more detail why the quality of a start-up 
should make a difference to employment effects and provides an 
overview of the extant relevant empirical evidence. Section 3 focuses 
on data and measurement issues. The results of the empirical analysis 
are presented in Section 4 and the final section (Section 5) discusses 
implications for policy, as well offering some suggestions for further 
research. 
2. Why should the quality of an entry be important for its 
employment effects? 
Recent empirical studies have shown that the effect of new business 
formation on regional development occurs over a longer period of time.
3 
Typically, the effects take place over several phases. In the first phase, 
setting-up of new businesses obviously leads to an employment 
increase because extra personnel are needed to begin operations. This 
can be regarded as the direct employment effect of new businesses. 
However, there are two other effects that new businesses may have on 
employment. One of these is the displacement effect, which results 
from competition between new and incumbent businesses on input as 
well as on output markets. The entry of new ventures spurs market 
                                            
3 Audretsch and Fritsch (2002), Fritsch and Mueller (2004, 2008), Acs and Mueller 
(2008), Mueller et al. (2008), van Stel and Suddle (2008), Baptista et al. (2008), and 
Arauzo-Carod et al. (2008). 
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selection and as long as this market selection process works according 
to a “survival of the fittest” scenario, the least productive firms will either 
reduce their level of economic activity or exit the market. Because such 
a scenario leads to a rise in average productivity, employment should 
decrease as long as output remains constant. There are, however, 
several ways competition by entry of new businesses can stimulate 
improvements on the supply side of the regional economy that may lead 
both to improved competitiveness and higher employment levels. The 
main supply-side effects of entry can include securing efficiency by 
contesting established market positions, accelerating structural change, 
amplifying innovation, and the provision of a greater variety of products 
and problem solutions (for a more detailed exposition, see Fritsch, 
2008). These supply-side effects are why one should expect positive 
employment effects of new business formation. 
Hence, new businesses may lead to employment growth because 
they stimulate competition by challenging incumbents. The effect of 
entries on economic growth depends on the competitive pressure that 
new firms exert on incumbents as well as on the incumbents’ response. 
This means that improvement may occur on the start-up side as well as 
on the incumbent side and, therefore, it is not completely necessary that 
the newcomers be successful and survive in order for them to make a 
contribution. Therefore, the development of new businesses, as 
measured by employment in start-up cohorts, reflects only a part of their 
effect on growth. In addition, displacement and supply-side effects need 
to be considered in assessing the overall contribution of new business 
formation to growth. In fact, Fritsch and Noseleit (2009a, 2009b) show 
that the indirect effects of new business formation are quantitatively 
much more important than the direct effects. 
New businesses may vary considerably in the degree of challenge 
they pose to incumbents. This challenge is closely related to the quality 
of the new ventures, which can be indicated by various factors such as 
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the innovativeness of their goods and services, the qualification of the 
entrepreneur, the amount and quality of mobilized resources, and the 
marketing strategy pursued, as well as by their productivity. Recent 
empirical studies suggest that start-ups in manufacturing generate a 
stronger overall employment effect than new businesses in other 
economic sectors (e.g., van Stel and Suddle, 2008). This is particularly 
remarkable because entry into manufacturing industries is relatively 
rare due to high entry barriers in terms of minimum efficient size and 
capital intensity. However, these high entry barriers may induce a 
higher quality of entries due to a self-selection of potential 
entrepreneurs, which could explain the comparatively larger economic 
effect of start-ups in manufacturing industries. Additionally, purely 
imitative entry of suppliers that simply replicates already available 
products using identical production processes and, consequently, 
maintains the same cost and price level, represents a far lesser 
challenge than innovative start-ups with completely new products or 
production processes that lower cost and maybe prices considerably. It 
is, therefore, not farfetched to assume that innovative entries may have 
a larger positive effect on growth than start-ups that are entirely 
imitative (for a more detailed exposition of the argument, see Fritsch 
and Schroeter, 2009). 
There are only a few empirical studies investigating the employment 
effect of start-ups differentiated by their sector affiliation or 
innovativeness. Concerning the direct employment effect of new 
businesses, empirical analyses for Germany provide evidence that the 
number of employees in start-up cohorts rises in the first one or two 
years but then declines quite quickly and even falls below the initial 
employment level after about eight years. This general pattern, 
however, varies greatly between sectors. The number of employees in 
cohorts of manufacturing start-ups becomes larger and remains above 
the initial employment level for a longer period of time than is the case 
in services (Fritsch and Weyh, 2006; Schindele and Weyh, 2011). 
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One may well assume a particularly positive employment 
development for innovative new ventures compared to non-innovative 
start-ups as they profit from a new and growing demand for their 
innovative products or services. Nevertheless, innovations are always 
prone to uncertainty as to market success and, if they involve R&D, also 
with respect to the success, cost, and duration of the R&D. But if 
innovative firms survive, it is plausible to expect them to grow rapidly. 
Empirical results on the survival of innovative firms are, however, 
mixed. Studies by Audretsch (1995) for the United States and by 
Audretsch et al. (2000) for the Netherlands indicate a relatively greater 
risk of failure for start-ups in industries with high R&D levels. In contrast, 
using data from the ZEW Founder Panel, Metzger and Rammer (2009) 
present evidence for somewhat higher survival rates for new ventures in 
innovative than in other industries in Germany. The results of Metzger 
and Rammer (2009) also suggest that new businesses in German 
innovative manufacturing industries and knowledge-intensive services 
create on average more jobs per start-up than entries in non-innovative 
and non-knowledge-intensive industries. 
To assess the overall growth impact of new firms, Audretsch et al. 
(2006) include the start-up rate (number of start-ups over population) in 
a regional production function as an input together with capital, labor, 
and R&D investment. In their analysis for West Germany, they find that 
start-ups in high-tech industries and in the information and 
communication industries had a statistically significant impact on the 
regional level of output as well as on the level of labor productivity. The 
coefficients for start-ups in these industries for explaining regional GDP 
were smaller than for start-ups in all industries. However, when labor 
productivity is used as a dependent variable, the coefficient for high-
tech entrepreneurship was higher. Causal interpretation of these results 
is problematic, however, since the empirical analyses are limited to the 
level of GDP and productivity, not to their development. 
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Analyzing the overall effect of new business formation on regional 
employment for Portuguese regions, Baptista and Preto (2011) find that 
the overall effect of on regional employment is substantially larger for 
businesses in knowledge-based industries than for start-ups in other 
industries. Particularly, the displacement effects as well as the supply-
side effects of new businesses in knowledge-based industries were 
much more pronounced than in non-knowledge-intensive industries. 
3. Data and measurement 
Our analysis of the effect of new business formation on regional 
economic development over time is at the spatial level of West German 
planning regions (Raumordnungsregionen). Planning regions consist of 
at least one core city and the surrounding area. Therefore, the 
advantage of planning regions in comparison to districts (Kreise) is that 
they can be regarded as functional units in the sense of traveling to 
work areas and that they account for economic interactions between 
districts. Planning regions are slightly larger than what is usually defined 
as a labor market area. In contrast to this, a district may be a single 
core city or a part of the surrounding suburban area (for the definition of 
planning regions and districts, see Federal Office for Building and 
Regional Planning, 2003). We excluded East Germany from our study 
since many analyses show that developments in East Germany in the 
1990s were strongly shaped by that region’s transformation to a market 
economy. Therefore, East Germany is a rather special case that should 
be analyzed separately (e.g., Kronthaler, 2005). The Berlin region was 
also excluded due to changes in its geographic definition after German 
reunification in 1990.
4 
                                            
4 For historical reasons, the cities of Hamburg and Bremen are defined as planning 
regions even though they are not functional economic units. To avoid possible 
distortions, we merged these cities with adjacent planning regions (Hamburg with the 
region of Schleswig-Holstein South and Bremen with Bremen-Umland). We thus have 
71 regions in our sample. 
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The data used in this study stem from the Establishment History 
Panel, which is based on official employment statistics. It is provided by 
the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the Federal Employment 
Agency (see Spengler, 2008, for details). This database is comprised of 
information on all establishments that have at least one employee 
subject to obligatory social insurance. Because the database records 
only businesses with at least one employee, start-ups consisting of only 
owners are not included. Unfortunately, the database is completely at 
the establishment level and thus does not allow us to separate new 
firms from new plants and branches created by existing firms. To avoid 
distortions caused by new large subsidiary plants of incumbent firms, 
new establishments with more than 20 employees in the first year of 
their existence are not counted as start-ups.
5 In addition, we excluded 
start-up and employment data in agriculture and fishery, energy, mining, 
railway, and postal services because of their highly regulated market 
conditions that strongly diverge from the rest of the economy. Data on 
population and population density are from the German Federal 
Statistical Office. 
New business formation activity is measured by yearly start-up rates 
calculated according to the labor market approach; namely, the number 
of start-ups per period is divided by the number of employees in the 
regional workforce (in thousands) at the beginning of the period. Start-
ups are classified as innovative or non-innovative according to their 
affiliation with certain industries. This classification is mainly based on 
the knowledge and R&D intensity of industries as well as on the 
innovativeness of their products (Grupp and Legler, 2000). 
Manufacturing industries are classified as innovative if their R&D 
intensity, i.e., the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales, is 3.5 percent or 
higher. Since many service firms do not have a standardized product 
                                            
5 The share of new establishments in the data with more than 20 employees in the first 
year is rather small (about 2.5 percent). 
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program but provide support according to the individual needs of their 
customers, they are not innovative in the same sense as manufacturing 
firms. Hence, service industries that may be relevant for innovation 
processes are entirely defined according to the knowledge intensity of 
their inputs. These knowledge-intensive service industries include, for 
example, “computer services,” “research and development in natural 
sciences and engineering,” and “business consultancy” (see Table A1 
in the Appendix). 
 
Table 1:  Average start-up rates and shares of start-ups in different 
types of industries 
 




Start-up rate  9.98  2.16  7.82 
Share in all start-ups (%)  100  22.97  77.02 
Start-up rate in innovative 
manufacturing  - 0.26  - 
Start-up rate in knowledge-
intensive services  - -  1.10 
Share of start-ups in innovative 
manufacturing (in %)  2.79 12.10  - 
Share of start-ups in 
knowledge-intensive service 
industries (in %) 
11.02 -  14.28 
 
On average, there were about 9.98 new businesses per 1,000 
employees set-up in the period under inspection (1988 to 2002). The 
start-up rate in services was about 7.82, and only 2.16 in manufacturing 
(Table 1). Start-ups in innovative manufacturing and knowledge-
intensive services were much less frequent, with rates of 0.26 and 1.10, 
respectively. New firms in knowledge-intensive service industries 
account for only about 11 percent of all start-ups and 14.28 percent of 
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all new ventures in services. New firms in innovative manufacturing 
industries represent a share of only 2.79 percent of all start-ups and 
12.1 percent of all new businesses set up in the manufacturing sector. 
Hence, new businesses in innovative manufacturing industries are very 
rare (Metzger and Rammer, 2009; see also Licht and Nerlinger, 1998, 
for the period 1985–1992). 
Our indicator for regional development is the average yearly change 
of employment (E) over a two-year period (percentage), i.e., between 
the current period t0 and t+2. A two-year average is used so as to avoid 
the effect of short-term fluctuations. Table A2 in the Appendix provides 
descriptive statistics and Table A3 shows the correlations between the 
variables in the analysis. There is considerable correlation between the 
start-up rates in the different sectors, particularly between start-up rate 
in services, manufacturing and in knowledge-intensive services.  
4. Empirical analysis 
In a first step, we analyze the direct employment effect of new business 
formation. This involves, on the one hand, the development of start-up 
cohorts differentiated by their affiliation with sectors and with innovative 
and knowledge-intensive industries. This analysis includes an 
investigation into the survival rates of new ventures belonging to 
different sectors and industries as the development of employment in 
start-ups cohorts is strongly linked to the success and failure of cohort 
firms. On the other hand, we look at the contribution of these different 
groups of new firms to overall employment (Section 4.1). In a second 
step, we assess the overall employment contribution of new businesses 
in different sectors and different types of industries including direct and 
indirect effects generated by the new ventures (Section 4.2). 
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4.1  The direct effect of new business formation on regional 
employment over time 
Our period of investigation, between 1988 and 2002, covers 15 yearly 
cohorts of new businesses. To identify their general pattern of 
employment development, we aggregate these cohorts and calculate 
average values. The development of start-up cohorts in the different 
industries is presented as indices, with the number of employees in the 
initial year given by an index level of 100 and the values of subsequent 
years representing the percentage share of the initial level. This 




Figure 1:   Evolution of employment in entry cohorts of all start-ups, 
start-ups in manufacturing, and start-ups in services 
 
Figure 1 displays the evolution of entry cohorts of all start-ups as 
well as of new firms in manufacturing and services. Consistent with 
previous findings for Germany, start-up cohorts in manufacturing 
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Schindele and Weyh, 2011). The average number of jobs in 
manufacturing start-ups reaches a maximum of 114 percent of the initial 
employment after two years and then declines to the original level six 
years after foundation. After 15 years, the number of employees is 
about 90 percent of the initial employment number. In contrast, the 
highest average employment level of entry cohorts in services amounts 
to 108 percent in the first year and reaches its basic level as soon as 
four years after foundation. Since most start-ups occur in the service 
sector, the cohort development of all start-ups is much weaker than for 
manufacturing and more resembles that of start-up cohorts in services. 
The diverging employment development of entry cohorts in 
manufacturing and services seems to be related to differences in the 
survival rates of new firms in both sectors. On average, about 59 
percent of new firms in manufacturing survive the first five years; this 
number is about 4 percent lower for new ventures in services. After 15 
years, 38 percent of the initial entries in manufacturing are still in the 
market compared to only 32 percent in services. As for employment 
development, the survival pattern of entry cohorts in services strongly 
resembles that of all start-ups since new firms in services make up the 
vast majority of all new businesses. 
Employment development in cohorts of start-ups in innovative 
manufacturing industries clearly exceeds that of their non-innovative 
counterparts (Figure 2). Employment in the average start-up cohort in 
innovative manufacturing industries rises to 121 percent of the initial 
level in the second year, compared to 109 percent for start-ups in 
manufacturing industries classified as being non-innovative. Although 
employment subsequently declines for both groups, the number of jobs 
in the innovative manufacturing start-ups never falls below the level of 
the initial year. Moreover, their employment development remains fairly 
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Figure 2:   Evolution of employment in entry cohorts of all manufacturing 
start-ups and start-ups in innovative and non-innovative 
manufacturing industries 
 
constant after seven years, at about 106 percent of the initial number of 
employees.
6 By contrast, employment in the average start-up cohort in 
non-innovative manufacturing industries falls below the initial level after 
four years and continues to decline until it is about 85 percent of the 
basic employment level after 15 years. Although the uncertainty 
associated with innovative business ideas might imply a higher risk of 
failure for such start-ups, new firms in innovative manufacturing 
industries experience a higher probability of survival than their non-
innovative counterparts, which might be an important reason for their 
larger job contribution. After five years, 65 percent, and after 15 years, 
44 percent, of all new business in innovative manufacturing industries 
                                            
6 The sharp increase in the number of jobs after 14 years is caused by the cohort of 
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are still in the market compared to 58 percent and 35 percent, 
respectively, of all entries in other parts of the manufacturing sector. 
 
 
Figure 3:   Evolution of employment in entry cohorts of all start-ups in 
services and start-ups in knowledge-intensive and non-
knowledge-intensive services 
 
Comparing the employment development of start-ups in knowledge-
intensive and non-knowledge-intensive service industries (Figure 3) 
reveals that the cohort employment in the first group strongly increases 
after foundation and reaches 124 percent of the initial level after four 
years. In subsequent years, the number of employees declines slightly 
but starts to increase again after 10 years, finally reaching 132 percent 
of the initial number of jobs. However, the high level of employment in 
the 14
th and 15
th year are caused by only two cohorts and thus need to 
be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the number of employees in 
the average cohort of knowledge-intensive start-ups remains clearly 
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of inspection. Moreover, it considerably exceeds the employment 
contribution of cohorts in innovative manufacturing. This is a remarkable 
difference, possibly attributable to the growing demand for high-end 
services as well as to increasing outsourcing of such activities in 
advanced economies (see, e.g., Peneder et al., 2003; Schettkat, 2007). 
Average development of start-up cohorts in non-knowledge-
intensive services is characterized by a weak employment increase up 
to 106 percent of the initial level in the first year. This is followed by a 
rapid decline back to the initial number of employees after only three 
years. After 14 years, only about three-quarters of the original number 
of employees are still employed in the new firms. Similar to the survival 
pattern of new firms in innovative and non-innovative manufacturing, 
knowledge-intensive start-ups in services are more successful than 
non-knowledge-intensive services as 60 percent and 39 percent of 
them survive the first five and 15 years, respectively, while these rates 
are about 7 and 9 percent lower for the other group of new ventures. 
Although new ventures in knowledge-intensive services have a higher 
probability of failure than those in innovative manufacturing industries, 
they create on average more jobs within the first 15 years. In contrast, 
non-knowledge-intensive start-up cohorts in services have lower 
survival rates and lower employment development compared to entry in 
non-innovative in manufacturing. 
Although the job evolution of entry cohorts in manufacturing 
industries considerably exceeds that of service industry entrants (Figure 
1), the overall employment development of these two large sectors of 
the German economy for the period 1988 to 2002 shows a quite 
different picture (Figure 4). The number of jobs in services grew 
steadily; employment in manufacturing had declined to about 83 
percent of the 1988 level by 2002. Within the service sector, an  
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Figure 4:   Evolution of total employment and employment in 




Figure 5:   Evolution of employment in innovative and non-innovative 
manufacturing industries as well as in knowledge-intensive 
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impressive job increase of 82 percent is observed for the knowledge-
intensive service industries and employment in non-knowledge-
intensive services rises about 17 percent. In contrast, employment in 
innovative manufacturing and non-innovative manufacturing industries 
declined steadily between 1988 and 2002 (Figure 5). These shifts in the 
employment pattern likely indicate the general long-term trend toward 
the service sector as well as the growing demand for high-end services 
and increasing outsourcing of knowledge-based activities in advanced 
economies (see, e.g., Peneder et al., 2003; Schettkat, 2007).  
To this point, we have investigated the evolution of employment in 
entry cohorts as well as their survival. However, to gain insight into the 
question of whether new business formation leads to employment 
growth, we now focus on the contribution of different entry cohorts to 
overall employment. Analyzing the shares in the direct employment 
effect of new business formation, i.e., the number of jobs that remained 
in the 15 yearly cohorts at the end of the period under inspection (1988 
to 2002), reveals some striking differences between the different groups 
of start-ups. Figure 6 shows that new firms in manufacturing created 
roughly 35 percent of all jobs in entry cohorts even though they 
represent only about 23 percent of all start-ups. The remaining 65 
percent of new jobs in new businesses are in service firms, which make 
almost 80 percent of all new ventures. These statistics clearly show that 
the manufacturing entries have a stronger direct employment effect 
than new businesses in the service sector. Such differences of the 
direct employment effect of new businesses become even more 
pronounced when distinguishing them by their innovativeness and 
knowledge intensiveness. Start-ups in innovative manufacturing 
contribute 16.6 percent to total cohort employment while accounting for 
only 2.77 percent of all new businesses. New firms in non-innovative 
manufacturing industries, which make up a bit more than 18 percent of 
all new businesses, generate about 18.3 percent of all new jobs. Start-
ups in knowledge-intensive service industries, which account for 11 
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percent of all start-ups, create 17.9 percent of all new employment in 
entry cohorts, while the share of new jobs in non-knowledge-intensive 
services is about 47 percent, which is considerably less than their share 
of 66 percent in the number of all start-ups. 
 
 
Figure 6:   Share of start-ups and employment contribution of start-ups 
differentiated by their sector affiliation and innovativeness 
 
The share of employees in the 15 yearly entry cohorts at the end of 
the period under inspection (2002) in total employment amounts to 
about 27 percent (Figure 6). Most of these new jobs are in new service 
firms (almost 18 percent of all new jobs in 2002); new manufacturing 
firms contribute about 9 percent of overall employment in the year 2002. 
Given their small number, new firms in innovative manufacturing and 
knowledge-intensive service industries create a relatively large share of 
overall employment—4.5 and 4.8 percent, respectively. The contribution 
of new businesses in non-innovative and non-knowledge-intensive 
industries to overall employment amounts to 4.9 and 12.6 percent, 
respectively. 
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The preceding analysis shows that cohorts of high-quality start-ups 
contribute relatively more to employment growth than do cohorts of their 
lower-quality counterparts. On the one hand, this is reflected by an 
employment evolution of high-quality entry cohorts that clearly exceeds 
those of new businesses of lower quality. On the other hand, given their 
share in all new firms, high-quality start-ups create a comparatively 
larger job share both in cohort as well as in total employment. We can 
thus confirm our first hypothesis that high-quality start-ups create a 
relatively stronger direct employment effect than start-ups of lower 
quality. 
4.2  The overall employment contribution of new business 
formation to regional employment over time 
Previous analyses of the effects of new business formation on 
employment over time for Germany (Fritsch and Mueller, 2004, 2008) 
find a statistically significant effect over a period of 10 years. Therefore, 
we regresses the start-up rate of the current year (t0) as well of the 10 
preceding years (t -1 to t -10) on the average rate of employment change 
in region r between t0 and t+2. We estimate: 
t r r t r t t r t r X rate up start average EMP , 1 , 10 0 , ,               , 
where the start-up rate is calculated as a moving average over a period 
of 10 years to allow for the time lag identified in previous analyses 
(Fritsch and Mueller, 2008), Xr,t -1 are other exogenous variables, μr is a 
regional fixed effect, and εr,t is the error term. Panel estimation 
techniques that allowed accounting for unobserved region-specific 
factors were employed. Application of the Huber–White method 
provided robust standard error estimates. 
The set of other variables (Xr,t-1) is included to account for factors 
other than start-ups that are relevant for regional growth. In particular, 
we include population density as a catch-all variable for a number of 
local characteristics that might affect regional growth, such as the wage 
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level, real estate prices, quality of the infrastructure, or qualification and 
diversity of the labor market. Since human capital is an important 
determinant of regional growth (Lucas, 1988; Glaeser et al., 1992), we 
add the regional share of highly-skilled employees, those with a tertiary 
degree, to our model. To account for the influence of industry structure 
on employment growth (Glaeser et al., 1992; Peneder, 2002; Combes, 
2000), we insert the employment shares of 27 out of 28 aggregated 
industries in our model. Finally, local employment growth may also be 
driven by proximity to other markets. Hence, we included a Harris-type 
market potential function, which is a distance-weighted sum of GDP per 
population in all other planning regions (Redding and Sturm, 2008; 
Südekum, 2008). This variable particularly controls for spatial 
autocorrelation. 
Table 2 shows our estimation results for the basic model and for 
different specifications of it. The effect of start-ups in all industries on 
regional employment growth is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level (Model I). Including only the new businesses in manufacturing 
(Model II) leads to a considerably higher effect than in the model that 
contains only the start-ups in services (Model III). However, Models II 
and III may overestimate the effects of start-ups since they include only 
start-ups in services or manufacturing. Overestimation of the effects of 
start-ups in a certain sector may particularly result from the pronounced 
correlation between the rates for the different sectors (see Table A3 in 
the Appendix). Hence, to avoid an omitted variable bias, all new 
ventures should be accounted for. In a model that contains start-ups in 
services and in manufacturing (Model IV), both indicators are 
statistically significant, with the effect of new ventures in manufacturing 
being larger than the effect for start-ups in services. This result is 
noteworthy since start-ups in manufacturing make up only about 20 
percent of all new businesses, whereas start-ups in services account for 
about 80 percent.   




I II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII 
Start-up rate all sectors  0.294*** 
(3.38)  - - - - - - - 
Start-up rate in manufacturing  -  0.265** 
(2.36)  -  0.190** 
(2.08)  - - - - 
Start-up rate in services  -  -  0.216*** 
(3.42) 
0.105* 
(1.68)  - - - - 
Start-up rate in innovative 
manufacturing industries  - - - -  -0.002 
(0.05)  - -  -0.035 
(0.84) 
Start-up rate in knowledge-intensive 
service industries  - - - - -  0.200*** 
(2.68)  -  0.172** 
(2.27) 
Start-up rate in non-innovative 






















































































R-squared  0.71 0.63 0.64 0.73 0.57 0.63 0.67 0.75 
Log-likelihood 753.6  751.1  753.1 756.1 726.5 751.7 751.0 767.1 
Number  of  observations  284 284 284 284 284 284 284 284 
Number  of  planning  regions  71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Notes: Fixed effect panel regression. Robust t statistics in parentheses. ***: statistically significant at the 1 percent level; **: statistically significant at the 5 
percent level; *: statistically significant at the 10 percent level. a): jointly significant at the 1 percent level. 
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manufacturing industries does not reveal any significant impact on 
regional employment growth (Model V). By contrast, new businesses in 
knowledge-intensive services (Model VI) have a distinct impact on regional 
growth (Model VI). Likewise, non-innovative start-ups in services and 
manufacturing exert a statistically significant influence on employment 
development that is only slightly smaller than the effect of knowledge-
intensive new ventures (Model VII). Including all three indicators in one 
model reveals a much larger growth effect from knowledge-intensive new 
firms than that of non-innovative manufacturing and service start-ups. The 
indicator for start-ups in innovative manufacturing industries remains 
insignificant (Model VIII). With regard to the control variables, we find a 
significantly positive effect of human capital intensity on regional 
employment growth, which is in line with our expectations. The local 
industry structure also plays a role; however, regional population density 
and proximity to other markets are insignificant. 
Based on the preceding results, our second hypothesis—that high-
quality start-ups will generate larger overall employment effects than their 
lower-quality counterparts—is confirmed with respect to new firms in 
knowledge-intensive service industries but not for innovative 
manufacturing industries. The insignificance of the effect of start-ups in 
innovative manufacturing industries on overall employment is surprising 
and fails to meet our expectations. We can think of at least two 
explanations for this result. First, new businesses in innovative 
manufacturing industries are very rare as they make up only 2.8 percent of 
all start-ups. Hence, their effect on overall employment may be too small 
to be statistically significant. Second, by regressing regional start-ups on 
employment change in the same region, we cover only that part of the 
displacement and the supply-side effects that occur in the same region. 
This incomplete coverage of the indirect employment effects of new 
business formation may be relatively pronounced with regard to start-ups 
in innovative manufacturing industries since these new businesses tend to 
operate to a greater extent in interregional markets than do those in non-
innovative industries. It is therefore plausible to assume that the 
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insignificant results for start-ups in innovative manufacturing do not 




Recent empirical analyses indicate a strongly positive relationship 
between the magnitude of the employment effects of start-ups and their 
quality. Our investigation firmly confirms these findings with regard to the 
direct employment effect of start-ups, i.e., the employment in the new 
firms, and partly as to their impact on overall employment. Distinguishing 
between different sectors, we find that new businesses affiliated with 
manufacturing industries have a stronger direct and total employment 
effect than do start-ups in services. Within these two large economic 
sectors, the new businesses affiliated with innovative and knowledge-
intensive industries make a relatively larger direct employment contribution 
than do their non-innovative and non-knowledge-intensive counterparts. 
Our argument that start-ups in innovative and in knowledge-intensive 
industries also cause comparatively larger total employment effects due to 
the relatively strong competitive pressure they exert on incumbents was 
confirmed only for new ventures in knowledge-intensive services. The 
insignificance of the effect of start-ups in innovative manufacturing on 
overall regional growth may be due to their relatively small number and/or 
because of estimation problems with regard to their displacement and 
supply-side effects. Nevertheless, our results show very clearly that not all 
start-ups are equally important for growth and that the quality of the new 
businesses as indicated by their affiliation with sectors and innovative and 
knowledge-intensive industries plays an important role. 
One weakness of our analysis, and one it shares with most other 
empirical work in this field, has to do with identifying innovative and 
knowledge-intensive services based on industry affiliation. Industry 
affiliation is an imprecise criterion for identifying innovative start-ups 
because the respective industries encompass quite a number of non-
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innovative firms and highly innovative start-ups can and regularly do occur 
in industries not classified as innovative. The reason this rough method is 
common practice in empirical analyses is that convincing alternatives are 
largely absent. We are also not aware of any comprehensive data set that 
allows for a better definition of innovative and knowledge-intensive start-
ups in Germany or in other countries. 
The empirical evidence clearly shows that it is only a relatively small 
share of all start-ups that is responsible for the main effect of 
entrepreneurship on growth. This suggests that a growth-oriented policy 
should focus on this type of start-up. Such a policy could be comprised of 
several strategies. For example, guard against any kind of market failure 
that will hamper innovative new businesses, such as an insufficient supply 
of venture capital or credit rationing. Second, stimulate the formation of 
more innovative start-ups. Third, provide after-entry support to innovative 
start-ups. 
The first strategy is conceptually unproblematic and widely agreed 
upon; the main difficulty is choosing the most appropriate policy 
instruments for its implementation. The second strategy, supporting the 
formation of innovative start-ups, offers a wide range of policy options. 
These include, for example, measures such as basic education in natural 
sciences, access to tertiary education, provision of entrepreneurial 
education programs, and creating an entrepreneurial climate, as well as 
implementing institutions conducive to innovative start-ups (for a more 
detailed discussion of these issues, see Henrekson and Johansson, 
2009). Since these instruments are indirect in nature and targeted at the 
pre-entry phase, they should pose no risk to the “survival of the fittest” 
scenario, which is a precondition for the emergence of positive supply-side 
effects of new business formation. Hence, introducing measures that are 
aimed at improving the quality of start-ups in the pre-entry phase is 
recommended. 
The third strategy encompasses many of the types of support for new 
ventures that already exist. However, many of these supports do pose a 
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threat to the survival of the fittest scenario, and need to be assessed with 
that caution in mind. For example, they can result in deadweight losses as 
well as substitution effects (Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2002; Vivarelli, 2004). 
In the first case, new firms obtain public support (e.g., subsidies) even 
though they do not need them in order to survive and grow. In the latter 
case, subsidies keep less efficient start-ups in the market, in the absence 
of which competition would have forced their exit. Such distortion of the 
market selection process hampers the emergence of supply-side effects of 
new business formation that tend to be quantitatively much more important 
than their direct effect, i.e., the jobs created in the young firms (for details, 
see Fritsch and Noseleit, 2009a, 2009b). Hence, subsidizing firms after 
market entry, no matter their quality, is not only a waste of taxpayers’ 
money but may also be harmful for growth. This strategy is not 
recommended. 
Our results clearly suggest that not all start-ups are of equal 
importance for growth and that the quality of new businesses plays an 
important role in this respect. The relationship between the quality of new 
businesses and its effect on overall economic development is a largely 
unexplored field, holding interesting and promising possibilities for further 
research. In this paper, we focused on innovativeness and knowledge-
intensity; future studies could investigate other aspects of quality, such as 
the qualification of the entrepreneur and the business concept, as well as 
the amount and quality of resources mobilized for the new business. A 
main bottleneck for such research is the measurement of quality. Further 
research should be devoted to the creation and validation of a more 
reliable and precise definition of innovativeness than that currently used, 
that is, industry affiliation. 
 




Table A1: Classification of innovative manufacturing industries and 
knowledge-intensive service industries 
 
Innovative manufacturing industries 
 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
  Manufacture of basic chemicals 
  Manufacture of other chemical products 
  Manufacture of man-made fiber 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
  Manufacture of general purpose machinery 
  Manufacture of special purpose machinery 
  Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c. 
Manufacture of office, accounting, and computing machinery 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
  Manufacture of electric motors, generators, and transformers 
  Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 
  Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 
  Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells, and primary 
batteries 
  Manufacture of electric lamps and lighting equipment 
  Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c. 
Manufacture of radio, television, and communication equipment and 
apparatus 
  Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic 
components 
  Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus 
for line telephony and line telegraphy 
  Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video 
recording or reproducing apparatus, and associated goods 
Manufacture of medical, precision, and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks 
  Manufacture of medical appliances and instruments and 
appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating, and 
other purposes, except optical instruments 
  Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers 
  Manufacture of motor vehicles 
  Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; 
manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers 
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  Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and 
their engines 
 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 
  Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling 
stock 





Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding 
Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation 
Renting of transport equipment; renting of other machinery and equipment 
Research and development activities 
Real estate activities 
Legal, accounting, book-keeping, and auditing activities; tax consultancy; 
market research and public opinion polling; business and management 
consultancy 




Source: Own classification according to Grupp and Legler (2000) 
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Table A2:  Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Standard 
Deviation 
Start-up rate (log)  2.104  2.112  1.501  2.763  0.232 
Start-up rate in 
manufacturing (log)  0.133 0.133 -0.401 0.660  0.187 
Start-up rate in services 
(log)  1.949 1.952 1.259  2.670  0.257 
Start-up rate in innovative 
manufacturing 
industries(log) 
-1.393 -1.384 -2.062  -0.747  0.232 
Start-up rate in 
knowledge-intensive 
service industries (log) 
0.014 0.007 -0.700 0.874  0.307 
Share of highly-skilled 
employees  0.050 0.043 0.014  0.183  0.025 
Population density  5.442  5.288 0.659  4.253  7.126 
Market potential (log)  -3.452  -3.435  -4.122  -2.871  0.261 
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Table A3: Correlations between variables (Pearson correlation 
coefficients) 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1  Start-up rate all sectors (log)  1               
2  Start-up rate in manufacturing (log)  0.848 1             
3  Start-up rate in services (log)  0.934 0.776 1           
4  Start-up rate in innovative 
manufacturing industries (log) 
0.441 0.641 0.375 1      
5  Start-up rate in knowledge-intensive 
services (log) 
0.719 0.434 0.754 0.337 1     
6  Share of highly-skilled employees 0.198 0.058 0.045 0.147 0.56  1     
7  Population density (log)  -0.031 -0.190 0.006 -0.024 0.401 0.603  1   
8  Market potential (log)  -0.393 -0.534 -0.349 0.161 0.401 0.577 0.508 1 
9 Employment  change  0.187 0.075 0.105 0.169 0.325 0.233 0.076 0.253
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